We document a channel of information flow from investment banks to their prime brokerage hedge fund clients. We examine whether hedge funds make informed trades on the stocks of firms that obtain new loans from the funds' prime brokerage services-providing banks. We find that these connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades prior to the loan announcement. Moreover, these trades by the connected hedge funds subsequently generate superior performance compared to other trades. The outperformance is highest for trades of connected hedge funds that have high revenue generation potential for their prime brokers, and amounts to 7.2% -8.8% per annum.
Introduction
In this study, we document a channel of information flow from investment banks to their prime brokerage hedge fund clients. Numerous prior studies have shown that hedge funds are informed traders.
1 However, the academic literature has paid less attention to the exact source of their information advantage. While this information advantage could well be due to managers' genuine skill, there are growing concerns that some hedge fund managers gain an information advantage via controversial channels. 2 We study one such information channel that is potentially available to many hedge funds: value-relevant information funds receive from their prime brokerage services-providing banks about these banks' corporate clients.
We focus on the flow of information from investment banks to hedge funds for two reasons.
First, as a key participant in the capital markets, investment banks often receive private information regarding their corporate clients as part of their advisory and origination activities. Second, hedge funds generate substantial revenue for investment banks because of commissions associated with their high-turnover trading strategies and fees associated with taking leveraged and short positions. 3 The highly profitable nature of prime brokerage services could incentivize the bank to share information to their hedge fund clients. 4 Although Chinese walls are set up to prevent such information transfer, as noted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), these information barriers are often not adequate. 5 Several recent academic studies document evidence consistent with information leakage from the corporate loan desk to other affiliated groups of investment banks (e.g., Acharya and Johnson (2007) , Massa and Rehman (2008) , and Chen and
Martin (2011)).
In this paper, we empirically test for evidence of information flow from investment banks to their prime brokerage hedge fund customers. In particular, we examine whether hedge funds make informed trades on the stock of a firm to which their prime broker's affiliated bank initiates a bank loan. We refer to the stocks of firms that receive a bank loan as treated stocks, and the hedge funds whose prime broker's affiliated bank initiates the loan as connected hedge funds. We develop two hypotheses around this question. First, if banks share such information to their prime brokerage hedge funds clients, we expect these hedge fund clients to exhibit abnormal trading activity in treated stocks prior to loan announcements. Second, we expect that the trades in treated stocks by connected hedge funds should earn higher returns compared to an appropriate control group.
We test these hypotheses using a merged dataset of hedge funds and their prime brokers from TASS, loan originations from Dealscan, and hedge fund holdings from 13F filings. This merged dataset allows us to test these hypotheses with two appropriate control groups. First, we compare the trades in treated stocks by connected hedge funds to the trades in other stocks in the same fund's portfolio (referred to as "same fund, different stocks," or SFDS test). Second, we find that broker-dealers gather information after executing informed trades and then share this information to their best institutional investor clients. 5 The SEC published "Staff Summary Report On Examinations of Information Barriers: Broker-Dealer Practices Under Section 15(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" in September 2012. The report notes that controls to prevent misuse of material non-public information (MNPI) were not often adequate. For example, the report states, "the apparent absence of related monitoring or other controls raises serious concerns about the ability of broker-dealers to guard adequately against misuse of MNPI in firm and customer trading."
compare the trades in treated stocks by connected hedge funds to the trades in the same treated stock by unconnected hedge funds (referred to as "same stock, different funds," or SSDF test).
Our results support the hypothesis that information flows from investment banks to their prime brokerage hedge fund clients. We find that connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades in treated stocks before loan announcements. We measure trade size using the absolute value of quarterly holding changes scaled by the fund's assets under management (AUM). We calculate funds' holding changes in the quarter prior to a loan announcement and find that the absolute holding changes by connected hedge funds in treated stocks are 8.8 basis points (bps) higher than in untreated stocks (SFDS test). In addition, the absolute holding changes in treated stocks by connected hedge funds are 8.5 bps higher than the trades in the same stock by unconnected hedge funds (SSDF test). These findings are economically significant given that the mean (median) absolute holding change in our sample is 22 bps (4 bps). In our time-series placebo analysis, we do not find similar evidence of abnormal trading by connected hedge funds using one-or two-year prior to loan announcement as the event date. We also do not find any abnormal trading in treated stocks in the cross-sectional placebo tests when we carry out the SFDS test over the sample of unconnected hedge funds.
We next examine whether the trades in treated stocks by connected hedge funds earn higher abnormal returns compared to the control groups. We calculate the trade performance measures by multiplying the sign of position changes in the quarter prior to the loan announcement by the return of the stock. We compute returns from the beginning of the quarter of the loan announcement to two days after the loan announcement is made public. This technique follows that used by Ivashina and Sun (2011) . In the SFDS context, trades by connected funds in treated stocks significantly outperform their trades in other stocks. For instance, the outperformance on an annualized basis amounts to 2.1% as measured by Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha and 2.4%
as measured by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) characteristic-adjusted return. Similarly, in the SSDF context, trades in treated stocks by connected funds outperform trades in the same stock by unconnected funds by 4.9% based on four-factor alpha and by 3.5%
based on DGTW characteristic-adjusted return on an annualized basis. 6 We also find that the outperformance of these trades is concentrated in connected hedge funds' buys rather than their sells, which could be because 13F holdings data only capture long, but not short, positions. In addition, we find that larger size trades in treated stocks by connected funds deliver higher future performance compared to these funds' smaller trades.
Finally, we investigate whether the information flow is more prevalent for hedge fund clients that have greater revenue potential. Presumably, investment banks' incentive to share information is higher for this type of hedge fund clients. Consistent with this idea, we find that connected hedge funds with higher AUM in equity styles (i.e., long-short equity or market neutral) earn higher returns in treated stocks compared to other connected funds. 7 Specifically, connected hedge fund companies with equity AUM in the top quartile earn 6.4%-8.4% higher on their trades in treated stocks relative to funds with lower levels of equity AUM. Furthermore, we find similar results for connected funds with high equity turnover or high leverage usage, which proxy for commission and lending based revenue, respectively.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study adds to the strand of literature that analyzes trading of non-public information by hedge funds. Ivashina and Sun 6 Since the returns to the stock are the same in the SSDF context, the outperformance is entirely driven by the sign of the trades by the connected and non-connected hedge funds. The connected funds "get it right" significantly more often than unconnected funds when trading connected stocks. 7 Because prime brokers generate revenue through commissions by executing trades and fees by providing financing for leveraged and short positions, hedge funds that primarily trade in equities and those who take short positions have particularly high revenue potential. A report on prime brokerage by Barclays Capital Solutions Group in 2015 notes that long-short equity funds are one of the most valuable types for prime brokerage revenues.
(2011) show that institutional investors that invest in corporate loans use private information disclosed by the borrowing firms during loan amendments to trade in the stock of the borrowing firm. Massoud et al. (2011) find that hedge funds that co-invest in syndicated loans short-sell the equity of the borrowers prior to public announcements of loan originations. Our paper is different from these two studies as we focus on the role of prime broker in the information channel. Our results are not confounded by hedge funds' direct investment into loans as we exclude all loans where hedge funds are co-investors. Qian and Zhong (2017) find that hedge funds earn abnormal returns in IPO stocks, and more so when their prime brokers serve as the IPO underwriters. Share allocation in IPOs plays a critical role in their setting and it is difficult to isolate the effect of information sharing by prime brokers given that there is no way to observe trading before the IPO.
Our setting avoids this pitfall and allows for a cleaner test of information sharing by prime brokers to their hedge fund clients.
Second, our paper adds to the literature that analyzes potential information leakage from the lending division of a financial institution. Acharya and Johnson (2007) argue that bank lenders use insider information about their borrowing clients in the credit default swap market. Massa and Rehman (2008) provide evidence that private information about the banks' borrowing firms flows from banks to their affiliated mutual funds. Chen and Martin (2011) demonstrate that bankaffiliated analysts use private information from the banks' lending activities to improve their forecast accuracy. While all these studies document information flow from one unit to another within the same institution, our study shows that information flows from financial institutions to their outside clients through the prime brokerage relationship. In particular, our evidence suggests that hedge funds trade and capitalize on information that their prime-brokers' affiliated banks possess on the borrowing firms.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on hedge fund prime brokers. A number of studies in this literature show that prime broker distress can cause contagion among hedge funds sharing the same broker (e.g., Klaus and Rzepkowski (2009 ), Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010 ), and Aragon and Strahan (2012 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data and variable construction. Section 3 discusses the design of our empirical analysis. Sections 4 and 5 examine the size and performance of trades by hedge funds, respectively. Section 6 sets forth our conclusions. Holdings data to obtain information on stock holdings at the hedge fund company level.
Data and Variable Construction
Institutions that hold at least $100 million in Section 13(f) securities are required to disclose their institution-level holdings on a quarterly basis. 9 We obtain data on stock prices and returns from We also eliminate all loans to borrowers that do not have common stocks in the CRSP database.
We construct our merged dataset as follows. First, we merge the Dealscan data to TASS by manually matching the prime broker names in TASS to the lead lenders in Dealscan. Next, we eliminate fund-broker-loan observations made to companies before a hedge fund's inception date or after a fund died. Lastly, we manually match hedge fund companies in TASS to those in the 13F database and obtain their quarterly stock holdings. Because 13F filings are at the companylevel, we exclude duplicate fund company holding observations (e.g., cases where multiple funds 10 Our results are qualitatively similar if we consider all loan events in Dealscan. 11 Roberts and Sufi (2009) 
Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics in Table 1 The average (median) quarterly position change in our sample is 0.22% (0.04%). The means and medians of the other stock characteristic variables are comparable to those found in the literature.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Empirical Design
Our empirical design is tailored to examine whether information about corporate clients flows from investment banks to their prime brokerage hedge fund clients. To examine this question, we focus on a particular corporate event where a bank has value-relevant information about a firm that could be shared with hedge fund clients -the grant of a loan by the bank to a firm. Banks expend considerable resources in due diligence and screening firms before granting loans. For our sample of loans, the median time between the day a bank receives the mandate for a loan and the day the loan is closed is 75 days. During this time, the bank screens the firm and obtains a lot of private information about the firm (e.g., Taylor and Sansone (2007) ). The considerable time gap between the mandate date and the loan announcement date provides many opportunities for information to flow from the bank to its prime brokerage hedge fund clients.
In our empirical tests, we examine whether hedge funds make informed trades on the stock of a firm to which their prime broker's affiliated bank initiates a bank loan. We refer to the stocks of firms that receive a bank loan as treated stocks and the hedge funds whose prime broker initiates the loan as connected hedge funds. We develop two hypotheses around this question. 
Hedge Fund Trading Ahead of Loan Events

Do Hedge Funds Trade More Before Loan Announcements?
In this section, we examine hedge funds' trading behavior in the stocks of firms to whom their prime broker's affiliated bank initiates a loan. Specifically, we analyze funds' holding changes in the calendar quarter before a loan announcement. In the analysis that follows, we define a loan event as an instance where a bank initiates a loan to a firm in a given quarter. Our hypothesis is that, if hedge funds obtain information about these stocks, they will make bigger changes in their portfolios for these treated stocks in the quarter before the loan event. As mentioned earlier, our empirical strategy relies on two control groups: (i) the same fund's trades in non-treated stocks (i.e., the SFDS test) and (ii) unconnected funds' trade in the treated stock (i.e., the SSDF test).
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the following linear regression:
where i indexes fund companies, j indexes stocks, and t indexes time. The dependent variable in this regression is ∆ ℎ , , −1 which is the absolute value of the change in fund company i's ownership in stock j scaled by its AUM in the quarter prior to the loan being initiated (i.e., change from the holdings at the end of t-2 to the holdings at the end of t-1). on results in column (4), connected hedge funds make 8.8 bps larger changes in the stock-holdings of companies to whom their prime brokers make loans as compared to the stock-holdings of nonloan receiving companies in their portfolios. Considering that the average change in a fund company's positions is 21.8 bps, this difference is economically significant (i.e., equal to 40% of the average ownership change).
[Insert Table 2 about here] Panel B contains the results when we use the SSDF control group. The coefficient on Loan in column (1) is 0.147 and has a t-statistic of 4.43. In the most robust specification with stockquarter fixed effects, our point estimate remains highly economically (β = 0.085) and statistically (t-stat = 2.15) significant. This result suggests that fund companies whose prime brokers initiate these loans make 8.5 bps larger changes in their portfolios in these stocks than do fund companies whose brokers do not initiate these loans (i.e., 39% larger than the average ownership change).
Combined, the results in Table 2 suggest that hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stock of the companies to whom their prime broker's affiliated bank initiates a loan in the subsequent quarter.
Placebo Tests on Trading Behavior
Although the results above provide preliminary evidence that hedge funds trade aggressively on stocks in which their prime brokers have private information, there could be other explanations for these results. For the SFDS case (Panel A), an alternative explanation could be that private information about the loan spills over to the public. Hence, all funds would trade these stocks more aggressively. For the SSDF case (Panel B), one could argue that the treated hedge funds are fundamentally different from the control funds. For example, the treated funds just trade more aggressively all the time. 12 To mitigate concerns that such alternatives could drive our results, we perform a series of cross-sectional and time-series placebo tests.
We start with the cross-sectional placebo tests to address omitted variable concerns in the SFDS specification. If the results in Panel A of Table 2 are driven by information spillover about borrowing firms through other channels, then we should find similar results when analyzing unconnected funds. Keeping the same event definition as in Panel A, we switch from analyzing connected funds' trading behavior to analyzing unconnected funds' trading behavior during the event windows. We compare unconnected funds' holding changes in the treated stocks to their holding changes in the other stocks in their portfolios by estimating equation (1) for the sample of unconnected funds. Because these funds' prime brokers are not initiating the loans for these stocks, 12 Our test setting and regression specification minimize this concern. By construction, each fund in our dataset gets treated at least once. We do not include funds whose prime brokers are not affiliated with any financial institution active in syndicated loan underwriting. This ensures that control funds are not very different from treated funds for a given loan event. In addition, our regression specification controls for several fund characteristics. The only remaining concern is that some hedge funds get treated more often than others, and those that are treated frequently might be different from those that get treated less often.
we expect that their trading in these stocks will be significantly lower than that that of connected funds whose prime brokers actually do initiate the loans. We use F-tests to determine whether the trading behavior for the two groups of funds is statistically different from one another.
The results of these tests are contained in column (1) of Table 3 . The coefficient on Loan is higher for the connected sample of funds as compared to the unconnected sample. As shown in column (1) of row (c), the difference in coefficients is economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level (diff. = 0.063, with a p-value of 0.008). This cross-sectional placebo test provides further evidence that connected hedge funds' trades are especially large in the companies to whom their prime brokers' corporate lending units are giving loans.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Next, we use time-series placebo tests to alleviate concerns that our results could be driven Finally, we combine the cross-sectional and time-series placebo tests and conduct a differences-in-differences-in-differences test. We start with repeating the time-series placebo test for the unconnected funds in columns (2) and (3) of row (b). As expected, the coefficients on Loan during the two placebo periods are small and insignificant. Then, we carry out the cross-sectional placebo tests by comparing the connected funds and the unconnected funds during the placebo periods. Our results suggest that the difference in trading behavior is small and statistically insignificant during these placebo periods, as shown in columns (2) and (3) of row (c). Lastly, we compute the difference in the differences calculated in row (c) for the actual period and the two placebo periods. As presented in row (e) of Table 3 , both differences are large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Hence, the only time the two groups of funds differ in their trading behavior is in the period in which connected funds' prime broker-affiliated banks actually initiate the loans.
Taken together, our results in this section provide further evidence that hedge funds make abnormally large trades in stocks of the corporate clients of their prime brokers' affiliated banks right before these corporations obtain loans.
Hedge Fund Trading Performance
The results in Section 4 provide strong evidence that hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stocks of firms that obtain loans from their prime brokers' affiliated banks. Since this evidence is on the absolute trade size, it does not necessarily suggest that these are informed trades.
If hedge funds gain an information advantage due to their connection via their prime brokers, one would expect that these funds not only make larger, but also more profitable trades before loan events. In this section, we investigate whether connected hedge funds have abnormal performance in their trades of these treated stocks.
To do so, we adopt an event study methodology and begin by calculating several performance measures for each stock using its daily returns. We compute each performance measure for the period that begins at the beginning of the quarter a loan is initiated and ends two trading days after the initiation. The nature of the 13F holdings data dictates our choice of the beginning of the return window. We want to measure holdings changes before the public announcement of the loan event. The most recent holdings change data available for a given loan event is at the beginning of the quarter. We choose the end of the window to be two trading days after loan announcement to ensure information about the loan has been incorporated in the stock price. The first variable we compute is Raw Return, which is equal to the cumulative stock return over the period. CAPM Alpha is the intercept of a regression of a stock's daily returns on excess market returns. Similarly, Four-Factor Alpha is the intercept of a regression of a stock's daily returns on the Carhart (1997) model, which includes the Fama-French (1993) market, size, and value factors plus the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ). Finally, we compute DGTW as the difference between the stock's cumulative daily return and that of its characteristicbased portfolio as in Daniel et al (1997) .
Following Ivashina and Sun (2011) , we "sign" our performance measures based on whether a fund increases or decreases its position in a given stock. Specifically, we create a variable I that is equal to 1 if a fund increases its position in a stock, 0 if a fund maintains its current position in a stock, and -1 if a fund decreases its position in a stock. We multiply the stock's actual return (or alpha) by I and use it as our trade performance measure. Then we compare the performance of the funds' trading in the stocks receiving loans to the control groups in the SFDS and SSDF tests, respectively. Note that we multiply stock returns by trade direction, rather than trade size, to facilitate comparison across funds or across stocks. The reason is that while the decision to buy or sell only depends on the direction of the information signal, trade size could depend on additional factors such as fund and stock characteristics.
Are Trades by Connected Hedge Funds More Profitable?
We begin our analysis on trade profitability using the SFDS control group. 
where Loan is as defined throughout the paper and StockVars is a vector of stock characteristics that includes market capitalization, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity, average trading volume, and institutional ownership. is a vector of fund × loan fixed effects. Essentially, for a given fund-quarter, we compare the trading performance in a treated stock to the performance in the remainder of the fund's portfolio. If connected hedge funds do receive information from their prime brokers' affiliated banks, we expect the coefficient on Loan to be positive and significant.
Panel B of Table 4 contains the results of these regressions. The coefficients on Loan are uniformly positive and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The coefficients range from 2.11 to 2.45. As the results in columns (3) and (4) suggest, connected hedge fund performance on treated stocks are better than their performance on non-treated stocks by 2.11% and 2.45% per year based on Four-Factor Alpha and DGTW, respectively.
Next, we repeat our performance analysis using the SSDF control group. If funds receive information from their prime brokers, we expect that the funds whose brokers make the loans will outperform the funds whose brokers do not make the loans on these stocks' trades. Since the return on the treated stock is the same for both types of funds, this difference in performance is explained entirely by the connected funds trading in the correct direction more frequently than the unconnected funds. In other words, the connected funds are more likely to buy future winners and sell future losers than the unconnected peers. Tables 4 and 5 provide strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis that a fund's prime broker is a source of information about the stocks to whom they give loans.
Our next set of tests examines funds' performance on these loan stocks separately for their buys and sells. Specifically, we estimate the regression in equation (2) separately for each fund's buys and sells using the SFDS sample. Table 6 negative information and shorts that stock, we will be unable to observe that trade in our data set.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Revenue Potential for Prime Brokers and Trading Performance
In this subsection, we examine whether trading is more profitable for certain types of fund companies. If investment banks were to provide information to their prime brokerage hedge fund clients, one would expect them to more likely provide valuable information to clients who give them more business. Although we cannot directly observe the fees each hedge fund client pays to its broker(s), we can use proxies for this variable. One proxy for this variable would be the level of a fund company's AUM in equity strategies (long-short equity and equity market neutral).
Because prime brokers earn commissions by executing trades and providing financing for leveraged and short positions, fund companies that primarily trade in equities and those who take short positions would presumably generate more revenue for the prime brokers. 13 We expect investment banks to provide better information to clients that generate high brokerage revenue as a way to retain these clients. For this reason, we expect that these clients will perform better on the loan stocks in their portfolios.
To test this conjecture, we construct an indicator variable, High Equity AUM, to be equal to 1 when a fund company is in the top quartile of equity AUM and 0 otherwise. We then augment the regressions in equation (2) [Insert Table 7 about here]
Next, we construct two additional variables that measure the two broad sources of revenue for prime brokers -turnover and financing. We construct the dollar turnover measure for each further evidence in support of our main hypothesis as they suggest that the quality of the information provided to hedge fund firms depends on their value to the prime broker.
Are Larger Trades More Profitable?
If connected hedge funds receive value-relevant information from their prime brokers and make trades in treated stocks based on this information, then both the direction and size of these trades should be informative about future stock performance. In this subsection, we test whether larger trades by connected hedge funds before loan events predict larger future abnormal returns for the treated stock.
To perform this analysis, we focus on the connected funds, treated stocks sample. We estimate the following linear regression:
where i indexes fund companies, j indexes stocks, and t indexes time. The dependent variable is stock performance measure computed for the period that begins at the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated and ends two trading days after the loan is initiated. The key explanatory variable is ∆ ℎ , , −1 which is the change in fund company i's ownership in stock j scaled by its AUM in the quarter prior to the loan being initiated. , −1 is a vector of stock-level variables, , −1 is a vector of hedge fund company-level variables, and and −1 represent fund and year fixed effects, respectively.
If connected funds' trades in treated stocks are really driven by private information about these stocks, then relatively larger trades in treated stocks should be associated with relatively larger future stock performances. Hence, we should expect the coefficient on ∆ ℎ , , −1 to be positive and statistically significant. Table 8 reports the results of this analysis. The coefficients on ∆ ℎ , , −1 range from 13.04 to 17.28 and are statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all four specifications. Economically, the results in column (3) suggest that one standard deviation increase in holdings change in a treated stock by a connected fund is associated with a 3.2 percentage points increase in four-factor alpha on an annualized basis.
Similarly, the results in column (4) suggest that one standard deviation increase in holdings change in a treated stock by a connected fund is associated with a 3.0 percentage points increase in DGTW characteristic-adjusted return on an annualized basis. These results provide further support to the hypothesis that hedge funds engage in informed trading prior to loan events where their prime broker's affiliated bank has private information.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Conclusion
The popular press often accuses hedge funds of trading on information not available to other market participants. In this paper, we provide evidence that one potential source of such information is a fund's prime brokerage services-providing bank. Specifically, we find that hedge funds engage in abnormal trading activity in the stocks of firms to which their prime broker's affiliated bank initiates a loan, i.e., these funds make abnormally large trades in connected stocks prior to the loan announcement. Moreover, these trades subsequently generate superior performance compared to other trades. In particular, the outperformance amounts to 7.2% -8.7%
per annum for trades by connected hedge funds in the top quartile of revenue generation potential for prime brokers.
Our evidence of informed trading ahead of loan announcements is consistent with material information flow from prime brokerage services-providing banks to their favored hedge fund clients. It is also possible that the information shared is immaterial on its own but becomes valuable once combined with other information signals that these connected hedge funds have. At the minimum, our analysis uncovers the existence of a systematic link between hedge fund informed trading activities and their connection with prime brokers.
Our results have implications for academics, regulators, and corporations. For academics, our paper contributes to our understanding of informed trading by hedge funds, and documents evidence suggestive of information leakage by lending institutions. For regulators, our evidence suggests that financial institutions may be breaching the Chinese walls that are supposed to exist between divisions to provide information to more favored clients. Lastly, our results imply that corporations should be concerned about the security of the information that they provide to their lenders.
Variable Definitions
Variable Description
Fund-company variables
Number of Stocks Held
The total number of stocks disclosed in the fund company's 13F filing in a given quarter.
Fund Returns
The average of the annual returns of the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
Fund Flows
The average of annual percentage flows of the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
Fund Size
The average of the assets under management of the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
Management Fee
The average management fee changed by the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
Incentive Fee
The average incentive fee changed by the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
Lockup Period
The average lockup period, in months, enforced by the hedge funds managed by a fund company.
High Water Mark
The percentage of hedge funds managed by a fund company that have a high water mark provision.
Offshore
The percentage of hedge funds managed by a fund company that are domiciled offshore.
Stock-holding variables
Change in Ownership
The absolute value of the percentage change of a fund company's AUM for a given stock holding.
Momentum
The cumulative stock return for the prior 12 months.
Volume
The average trading volume for a given stock over the past 12 months, scaled by shares outstanding.
Return Volatility
The standard deviation of the prior 12 monthly returns
Institutional Ownership
The percentage of shares outstanding owned by 13F institutions
Market Capitalization
The total number of shares outstanding multiplied by current share price.
Amihud
The square root of the absolute value of the daily return over daily dollar volume.
Book to Market
Book assets divided by (book assets − book equity + market equity).
Table 1 -Summary Statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for the fund company variables we use in our analysis. We report the statistics of these variable tabulated at the fund company -quarter horizon. Panel B contains summary statistics for the stock holding variables we use in our analysis. The statistics for these variables are tabulated at the individual holding level. All variables are defined in the Appendix and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Table 2 using the actual date of loan initiation as well as for two placebo periods: minus 1 year and minus 2 years. Loan is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock received a loan in the next quarter and 0 otherwise. The differences in coefficients as well as F-tests of the significance of these differences are reported. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the fund company level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Fund Company Variables
(1) (2) is equal to 1 if fund company i increased its position in stock j in the quarter before the loan is initiated, 0 if fund company i made no change in its position in stock j, and -1 if fund company i decreased its position in stock j in that quarter.
, is either the raw return, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, or DGTW measure for stock j and is calculated using the daily returns from the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated until two trading days after the loan is announced. Panel A reports the univariate results and Panel B reports the results of multivariate regressions where the variable of interest is Loan, an indicator variable equal to 1 for stocks that receive loans and 0 for those stocks that do not receive loans. The stock-level control variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by fund company × loan initiation date and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. , , −1 × , , where , , −1 is equal to 1 if fund company i increased its position in stock j in the quarter before the loan is initiated, 0 if fund company i made no change in its position in stock j, and -1 if fund company i decreased its position in stock j in that quarter.
Panel A. Univariate Tests
, is either the raw return, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, or DGTW measure for stock j and is calculated using the daily returns from the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated until two trading days after the loan is announced. Panel A reports the univariate results and Panel B reports the results of multivariate regressions where the variable of interest is Loan, an indicator variable equal to 1 for hedge funds whose prime broker initiates a loan to the stock and 0 otherwise. The stock-level control variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by stock × quarter and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. is equal to 1 if fund company i increased its position in stock j in the quarter before the loan is initiated, 0 if fund company i made no change in its position in stock j, and -1 if fund company i decreased its position in stock j in that quarter.
, is either the raw return, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, or DGTW measure for stock j and is calculated using the daily returns from the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated until two trading days after the loan is announced. Panel A reports the univariate results and Panel B reports the results of multivariate regressions where the variable of interest is Loan, an indicator variable equal to 1 for stocks that receive loans and 0 for those stocks that do not receive loans. The stock-level control variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by fund company × loan initiation date and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table examines whether returns of hedge fund trades are related to the revenue potential to prime brokers as proxied by hedge funds' AUM in equity styles (e.g., long-short or market neutral). We carry out the analysis using the same fund, different stocks specification. Returns are calculated as , , −1 × , , where , , −1 is equal to 1 if fund company i increased its position in stock j in the quarter before the loan is initiated, 0 if fund company i made no change in its position in stock j, and -1 if fund company i decreased its position in stock j in that quarter.
Panel A. Buys
, is either the raw return, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, or DGTW measure for stock j and is calculated using the daily returns from the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated until two trading days after the loan is announced. We define a dummy variable for the top quartile hedge funds companies based on their revenue potential to prime brokers. In Panel A, revenue potential is measured by hedge funds' AUM in equity styles (e.g., long-short or market neutral). In Panel B, revenue potential is measured by hedge funds' quarterly dollar turnover in holdings. In Panel C, revenue potential is measured by hedge funds' use of prime broker financing. Broker financing is measured by multiplying AUM in equity style by a dummy that equals 1 if the fund uses leverage or margin financing. In each panel, we interact the top quartile dummy with the Loan indicator variable, which equals to 1 for stocks that receive loans and 0 otherwise. The stock-level control variables are defined in the Appendix. The coefficients on these control variables are not reported to save space. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by fund company × loan initiation date and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. High Equity AUM
(1) (2) (3) This table reports returns on connected hedge funds trades in stocks of firms that receive loans from their prime broker's affiliated banks. Return is either the raw return, CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha, or DGTW measure for stock j and is calculated using the daily returns from the beginning of the quarter the loan is initiated until two trading days after the loan is announced. The key variable of interest is the change in connected fund company i's ownership in treated stock j scaled by its AUM in the quarter prior to the loan being initiated. The stock-level and fund-level control variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the fund company level. t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) 
